Abstract
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 23-30 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Topoi |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 20 Dec 2008 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- enaction
- extended mind
- autonomy
- sense-making
- emotion
- embodiment
- incorporation