Marr, Mayr, and MR: What functionalism should now be about

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Abstract

In this review essay on The Multiple Realization Book by Polger and Shapiro, I consider the prospects for a biologically grounded notion of multiple realization (MR) which has been given too little consideration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Thinking about MR in the context of biological notions of function and robustness leads to a rethink of what would count as a viable functionalist theory of mind. I also discuss points of tension between Polger and Shapiro’s definition of MR and current explanatory practice in neuroscience
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-418
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume31
Issue number3
Early online date26 Mar 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Apr 2018

Keywords

  • functionalism
  • philosophy of neuroscience
  • multiple realization
  • philosophy of biology

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