Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2007

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

Keywords

  • matching
  • sorting
  • uniqueness
  • horizontal heterogeneity
  • marriage
  • C7

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