Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

Simon Clark

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Abstract / Description of output

This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2007

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • matching
  • sorting
  • uniqueness
  • horizontal heterogeneity
  • marriage
  • C7

Access to Document

  • Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

    © Clark, S. (2007). Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like. (ESE Discussion Papers). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

    Final published version, 430 KB

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