TY - UNPB
T1 - Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity
AU - Clark, Simon
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, â??like attracts likeâ?�. Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of characteristics among the two sexes. In particular, the greater the difference between men and women, the greater the tendency to negative assortment. Constraints on who can match with whom may improve welfare and we interpret this as a theory of social stratification.
AB - This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, â??like attracts likeâ?�. Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of characteristics among the two sexes. In particular, the greater the difference between men and women, the greater the tendency to negative assortment. Constraints on who can match with whom may improve welfare and we interpret this as a theory of social stratification.
M3 - Discussion paper
T3 - ESE Discussion Papers
BT - Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity
PB - Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
ER -