Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, â??like attracts likeâ?�. Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of characteristics among the two sexes. In particular, the greater the difference between men and women, the greater the tendency to negative assortment. Constraints on who can match with whom may improve welfare and we interpret this as a theory of social stratification.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

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