Metrological legitimacy and the human sciences

Alistair M. C.  Isaac

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.008

Metrological legitimacy and the human sciences

Alistair M. C. Isaac

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

When is it scientifically permissible to represent the outcome of an experiment numerically, such that algebraic manipulations of that representation are meaningful? This is the question of quantification. In the terminology of measurement theory, it amounts to the question of whether the outcome of a putative measurement procedure may legitimately be represented on an interval or ratio scale. This article defends a particular answer to this question: quantitative representation is permissible when numerical assignments uniquely specify invariant relationships between the outcomes of a contingent, well-defined procedure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	79-89
Number of pages	11
Journal	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Volume	112
Early online date	26 Jun 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.008
Publication status	Published - Aug 2025

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

representational theory of measurement
quantity objection
invariance
meaningfulness
magnitude estimation
factor analysis

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10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.008Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY)

IsaacSHPS2025MetrologicalFinal published version, 1.3 MBLicence: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.06.008Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY)

Cite this

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title = "Metrological legitimacy and the human sciences",

abstract = "When is it scientifically permissible to represent the outcome of an experiment numerically, such that algebraic manipulations of that representation are meaningful? This is the question of quantification. In the terminology of measurement theory, it amounts to the question of whether the outcome of a putative measurement procedure may legitimately be represented on an interval or ratio scale. This article defends a particular answer to this question: quantitative representation is permissible when numerical assignments uniquely specify invariant relationships between the outcomes of a contingent, well-defined procedure.",

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AB - When is it scientifically permissible to represent the outcome of an experiment numerically, such that algebraic manipulations of that representation are meaningful? This is the question of quantification. In the terminology of measurement theory, it amounts to the question of whether the outcome of a putative measurement procedure may legitimately be represented on an interval or ratio scale. This article defends a particular answer to this question: quantitative representation is permissible when numerical assignments uniquely specify invariant relationships between the outcomes of a contingent, well-defined procedure.

KW - representational theory of measurement

KW - quantity objection

KW - invariance

KW - meaningfulness

KW - magnitude estimation

KW - factor analysis

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JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

ER -

Metrological legitimacy and the human sciences

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The Role of Theory in Justifying Quantification

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Metrological legitimacy and the human sciences

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The Role of Theory in Justifying Quantification

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