Abstract / Description of output
In discussions about mixed methods research, it has often been suggested that pragmatism provides the most suitable philosophical paradigm for such research. Sometimes this is argued, because mixed methods research takes a pragmatic rather than principled approach to the question of methods. While such a pragmatic stance has been helpful in overcoming the strong opposition between ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ approaches, I argue in this chapter that this does not imply that pragmatism provides the philosophical foundation for mixed methods research. One reason for this has to do with the complexities of what is actually being mixed in mixed methods research. Here I suggest that the most important question is not about data or methods but whether research aims to generate causal explanation or interpretative understanding of social phenomena. Through a detailed reconstruction of John Dewey’s ideas about knowledge and coming to know, I show that Dewey’s ideas are unable to provide a philosophical foundation for mixed methods research. Where Dewey’s work is helpful, however, is in highlighting that all research, irrespective of its ambitions, data, or methods, is a truly human endeavour, and therefore can only provide us with an insight in possibilities but never with absolute certainty.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research |
Subtitle of host publication | Dialogues between Researchers and Philosophers |
Editors | Yafeng Shan |
Place of Publication | London |
Publisher | Routledge |
Pages | 171-193 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781003806042 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781003273288, 9781032226118 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 1 Dec 2023 |