Modal accounts of luck

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract

Luck is clearly a philosophically important notion, having a role to play in philosophical debates in a wide range of fields, from metaphysics, political philosophy, ethics, and epistemology. One implication of dropping the significance condition is that it undermines an argument that Nathan Ballantyne has offered to the effect that incorporating the anti-luck condition into a theory of knowledge requires one to embrace pragmatic encroachment regarding knowledge. A recurring idea in the literature on luck, particularly moral luck, is that lucky events are events that the agent lacks control over. Construed as a rough necessary condition on luck, the claim is quite plausible, but so construed it is also not in any obvious tension with the modal account of luck. The alert reader will have noticed a common thread running through the responses to critiques of the modal account of luck.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck
EditorsIan M. Church, Robert J. Hartman
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter10
Number of pages10
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9781351258760
ISBN (Print)9780815366591, 9780367731663
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 22 Feb 2019

Publication series

NameRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Modal accounts of luck'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this