Moral experience: Perception or emotion?

James Hutton*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)570-597
Number of pages28
JournalEthics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy
Issue number3
Early online date1 Apr 2022
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2022


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