Abstract / Description of output
We extend Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, we establish a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (this was the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--we examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is of course the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, we establish a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. We use our theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1083-1099 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Econometrica |
Volume | 58 |
Issue number | 5 |
Publication status | Published - Sept 1990 |