Neopragmatism in the philosophy of perception? The case of primitive color

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This chapter considers the application of the neopragmatist methodology to the philosophy of perception, examining the case of color ontology in particular. In his account of the difference between objective and subjective, “precise” colors, Joshua Gert’s (2017b) neopragmatist version of primitivism has significant advantages over existing primitivist theories. But I argue that adherence to the naïve realist doctrine that colors are mind-independent properties of physical objects presents an obstacle to the promised deflation of the ontological problem of color. Thus I argue that to fulfil its promise, a neopragmatist philosophy of perception should dispense with this notion of mind-independence, adopting a methodological non-realism. This methodological stance has some similarity with the Kantian and Hegelian strand of idealism within classical American pragmatism.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNeopragmatism
Subtitle of host publicationInterventions in First-order Philosophy
EditorsJoshua Gert
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter4
Pages98-117
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)9780191915673
ISBN (Print)9780192894809
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • perception
  • color realism
  • scientific realism
  • methodological non-realism
  • primitivist theories

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