New privacy issues in mobile telephony: Fix and Verification

Myrto Arapinis; Loretta Mancini; Eike Ritter; Mark Ryan; Nico Golde; Kevin Redon; Ravishankar Borgaonkar

doi:10.1145/2382196.2382221

New privacy issues in mobile telephony: Fix and Verification

Myrto Arapinis, Loretta Mancini, Eike Ritter, Mark Ryan, Nico Golde, Kevin Redon, Ravishankar Borgaonkar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties using the automatic verification tool ProVerif.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Place of Publication	New York, NY, USA
Publisher	ACM
Pages	205-216
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4503-1651-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382221
Publication status	Published - 2012

Keywords

anonymity, mobile telephony, proverif, unlinkability

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http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382221

Cite this

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title = "New privacy issues in mobile telephony: Fix and Verification",

abstract = "Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties using the automatic verification tool ProVerif.",

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AU - Arapinis, Myrto

AU - Mancini, Loretta

AU - Ritter, Eike

AU - Ryan, Mark

AU - Golde, Nico

AU - Redon, Kevin

AU - Borgaonkar, Ravishankar

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties using the automatic verification tool ProVerif.

AB - Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties using the automatic verification tool ProVerif.

KW - anonymity, mobile telephony, proverif, unlinkability

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DO - 10.1145/2382196.2382221

M3 - Conference contribution

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EP - 216

BT - Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security

PB - ACM

CY - New York, NY, USA

ER -

New privacy issues in mobile telephony: Fix and Verification

Abstract

Keywords

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