Non-cooperative bargaining with arbitrary one-sided uncertainty

Sofia Ceppi, Nicola Gatti, Claudio Iuliano

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Non-cooperative bargaining is modeled as an extensive–form game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long–standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one–sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original continuous game. Computational complexity is polynomial with two types, while with more types the problem is hard and only small settings can be solved in exact way.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets
Subtitle of host publicationAMEC 2011, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2, 2011, and TADA 2011, Barcelona, Spain, July 17, 2011, Revised Selected Papers
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages1-14
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-642-34889-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-34888-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Business Information Processing
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg

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