Normative scorekeeping

Robin McKenna*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Epistemic contextualists think that the truth-conditions of 'knowledge' ascriptions depend in part on the context in which they are uttered. But what features of context play a role in determining truth-conditions? The idea that the making salient of error possibilities is a central part of the story has often been attributed to contextualists, and a number of contextualists seem to endorse it (see Cohen (Philos Perspect, 13:57-89, 1999) and Hawthorne, (Knowledge and lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)). In this paper I argue that the focus on salience relations is a mistake. On the view I defend, the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider, not facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context actually consider. As I will argue, this view has certain advantages over the standard view.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)607-625
Number of pages19
JournalSynthese
Volume191
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2014

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Contextualism
  • Epistemology
  • Edward Craig
  • Scorekeeping
  • Reasons
  • Philosophy of language
  • CONTEXTUALISM
  • KNOWLEDGE
  • SKEPTICISM

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