Abstract
We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and-in case they win-later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 339-357 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2003 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- alliance
- coalition formation
- conflict