@techreport{ba21d636755447faba00716431255bfb,
title = "Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict",
abstract = "We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and {\^a}?? in case they win {\^a}?? later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.",
author = "Joan Esteban and J{\'o}zsef S{\'a}kovics",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers",
publisher = "Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra",
}