Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict

Joan Esteban, József Sákovics

Research output: Working paper


We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and â?? in case they win â?? later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Publication series

NameEconomics Working Papers


Dive into the research topics of 'Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this