On information design in games

Laurent Mathevet; Jacopo Perego; Ina Taneva

doi:10.1086/705332

On information design in games

Laurent Mathevet, Jacopo Perego, Ina Taneva

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents’ beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents’ beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1370-1404
Journal	Journal of Political Economy
Volume	128
Issue number	4
Early online date	3 Mar 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/705332
Publication status	Published - 30 Apr 2020

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

information design
disclosure
belief manipulation
belief distributions
extremal decomposition
concavification

Access to Document

10.1086/705332

MathevetJPE2019OnInformationDesignInGamesFinal published version, 1.47 MB

Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms.
Sakovics, J. & Visschers, L.
ESRC
1/01/16 → 31/12/18
Project: Research

Ina Taneva
- School of Economics - Reader
Person: Academic: Research Active

Cite this

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title = "On information design in games",

abstract = "Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents{\textquoteright} beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents{\textquoteright} beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.",

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KW - information design

KW - disclosure

KW - belief manipulation

KW - belief distributions

KW - extremal decomposition

KW - concavification

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On information design in games

Abstract / Description of output

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

Access to Document

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Projects

Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms.

Profiles

Ina Taneva

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