On information design in games

Laurent Mathevet, Jacopo Perego, Ina Taneva

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents’ beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents’ beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1370-1404
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Issue number4
Early online date3 Mar 2020
Publication statusPublished - 30 Apr 2020

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • information design
  • disclosure
  • belief manipulation
  • belief distributions
  • extremal decomposition
  • concavification


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