Abstract
In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for
one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an
application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle.
one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an
application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Erkenntnis |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2014 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- precautionary principle
- contextualism
- environmental ethics