On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen

J. Adam Carter; Martin Peterson

doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3

On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen

J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.

Original language	English
Journal	Erkenntnis
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3
Publication status	Published - 5 Jun 2015

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On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen
© Carter, J. A., & Peterson, M. (2015). On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen. Erkenntnis. / The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3
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On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen

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