On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z

On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making her choice) and by an informed principal (who has private information and can condition her choice on that information). We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1051-1067
Number of pages	17
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	76
Issue number	4
Early online date	3 Apr 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z
Publication status	Published - Nov 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

information design
Bayesian persuasion
informed principal
implementation
sequential equilibrium

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10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z

ZapechelnyukA2023ETOnTheEquivalenceOfInformationDesignAccepted author manuscript, 352 KBLicence: Creative Commons: Attribution (CC-BY)

Cite this

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title = "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals",

abstract = "We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making her choice) and by an informed principal (who has private information and can condition her choice on that information). We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal.",

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AB - We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making her choice) and by an informed principal (who has private information and can condition her choice on that information). We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal.

KW - information design

KW - Bayesian persuasion

KW - informed principal

KW - implementation

KW - sequential equilibrium

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DO - 10.1007/s00199-023-01495-z

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On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Abstract / Description of output

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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