On the game-Theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium

Manolis Galenianos, Philipp Kircher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompass most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model. We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the finite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general production and matching specifications. The latter extends the microfoundations for the standard market utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum of agents to new environments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-21
Number of pages21
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2012

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