On the relationship between orientation and agency: From the Stoics’ oikeiōsis to Kant’s orientierung

Kant’s account of the function of orientation vis-à-vis human agency has been the subject of a recent debate in the literature. On the reading I have put forward, orientation consists in giving me a sense of myself and my activity in relation to the world so that I can reach the destination I have chosen (Cohen 2021). By contrast, Melissa Merritt has argued that orientating myself consists in having a sense of the direction I should follow in order to realise my rational vocation (Merritt 2021c). In this chapter, I propose to revisit this debate by examining Kant’s notion of orientation through the prism of the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. While Kant and the Stoics share the view that agency requires orientation and orientation requires a certain form of self-awareness on the part of the agent, they disagree on the function of orientation, and I believe that locating the source of their disagreement can be helpful in shedding light on Kant’s account.