On the security of an ECC based RFID authentication protocol

Parisa Babaheidarian, Mahshid Delavar, Javad Mohajeri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Following the fact that there are some efficient implementations of ECC-based RFID authentication protocols on RFID tags, a new family of RFID authentication protocols known as EC-RAC family has been introduced. However, it has been shown that all the versions of EC-RAC protocols are exposed to privacy and/or security threats. In this paper we analyzed a version of the EC-RAC RFID authentication protocol as well as a version of Schnorr protocol which were presented in a recent work and are claimed to have the demanding requirements. We demonstrated an impersonation attack on the claimed improved EC-RAC, and consequently showed that it would not satisfy the tag authentication property. Also, we showed that the improved Schnorr protocol does not provide the untraceability feature. Moreover, we discussed the inherent problems of the claimed protocols and why they fail.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2012 9th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Place of PublicationTabriz, Iran
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages111-114
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4673-2386-4
ISBN (Print)978-1-4673-2387-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jan 2013
Event2012 9th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology - Tabriz, Iran, Islamic Republic of
Duration: 13 Sep 201214 Sep 2012

Conference

Conference2012 9th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Abbreviated titleISC 2012
Country/TerritoryIran, Islamic Republic of
CityTabriz
Period13/09/1214/09/12

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