Openmindedness and Truth

J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an
intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous.
Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to
fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no
interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of
this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)207-224
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jul 2014


  • openmindedness
  • truth
  • epistemic virtue
  • epistemic value


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