Optical Fault Induction Attacks

Sergei P. Skorobogatov*, Ross J. Anderson

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

We describe a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards. Illumination of a target transistor causes it to conduct, thereby inducing a transient fault. Such attacks are practical; they do not even require expensive laser equipment. We have carried them out using a flashgun bought second-hand from a camera store for $30 and with an $8 laser pointer. As an illustration of the power of this attack, we developed techniques to set or reset any individual bit of SRAM in a microcontroller. Unless suitable countermeasures are taken, optical probing may also be used to induce errors in cryptographic computations or protocols, and to disrupt the processor's control flow. It thus provides a powerful extension of existing glitching and fault analysis techniques. This vulnerability may pose a big problem for the industry, similar to those resulting from probing attacks in the mid-1990s and power analysis attacks in the late 1990s. We have therefore developed a technology to block these attacks. We use self-timed dual-rail circuit design techniques whereby a logical 1 or 0 is not encoded by a high or low voltage on a single line, but by (HL) or (LH) on a pair of lines. The combination (HH) signals an alarm, which will typically reset the processor. Circuits can be designed so that single-transistor failures do not lead to security failure. This technology may also make power analysis attacks very much harder too.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002
EditorsBurton S. Kaliski, Cetin K. Koç, Christof Paar
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages2-12
Number of pages11
Volume2523
ISBN (Electronic)9783540364009
ISBN (Print)9783540004097
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jan 2003

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
PublisherSpringer Verlag
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

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