Pain for the moral error theory? A new companions-in-guilt argument

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Abstract

The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’; forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper I present a new, prudential, companions in guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic alternative.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)474-482
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume86
Issue number3
Early online date8 Oct 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Keywords

  • moral realism
  • moral error theory
  • well-being
  • prudential normativity
  • companions in guilt arguments

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