Sosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of "performance normativity," comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally conceived of beliefs as /states/, which means that they are not dynamic or telic like performances. A natural response to this tension is to argue that belief formation rather than belief itself is the proper target of epistemic normativity. This response is rejected here on grounds of the way it obscures the "here and now" exercise of cognitive agency that I view as central to any account of epistemic normativity and doxastic agency. Although the etiology of a belief can be relevant to its normative status, often so much more is relevant and more centrally so. This generates a dilemma for anyone following Sosa in pursuing the idea that epistemic normativity is a species of performance normativity.
- performance normativity
- Ethics of Belief
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- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences - Personal Chair of Ethics and Epistemology
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