Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the "Multiplicity Thesis" (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct on-line personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of thought as developed by Carol Rovane, and consider the conditions that would have to be in place for the possibility identified by MT to be realised. Finally I briefly consider the prospects for MT according to neo-Lockean and animalist views of personhood.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)497-515
Number of pages19
JournalMinds and machines
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2011


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