Perspectivalism about knowledge and error

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Knowledge and error have a quantitative dimension – we can know more and less, and we can be wrong to a greater or lesser extent. This fact underpins prominent approaches to epistemic normativity, which we can loosely call truth-consequentialist. These approaches face a significant challenge, however, stemming from the observation that some truths seem more epistemically valuable than others. In this paper I trace out this perspectivalist challenge, showing that although it arises from a mistaken picture of the quantitative dimension of knowledge and error, when we reconceive how that quantitative dimension should be understood we find the perspectivalist challenge has survived unscathed.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKnowledge from a Human Point of View
EditorsAna-Maria Crețu, Michela Massimi
PublisherSpringer
Chapter7
Pages107-121
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9783030270414
ISBN (Print)9783030270407, 9783030270438
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Dec 2019

Publication series

NameSynthese Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume416

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • veritism
  • epistemic normativity
  • truth
  • perspectivalism
  • similarity

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