Persuasion meets delegation

Anton Kolotilin*, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-228
Number of pages34
JournalEconometrica
Volume93
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Feb 2025

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • persuasion
  • delegation
  • discriminatory disclosure

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