Physicalism, functionalism and conscious thought

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

In this paper, I provide further elaboration of my theory of conscious experience, in response to the criticisms made by David Cole, and I directly address a number of the issues he raises. In particular, I examine Cole's claim that functionalism rather than neurophysiology is the theoretical key to consciousness. I argue that weak type-physicalism provides an analysis which is more fine grained, makes weaker assumptions, and allows more scope for empirical methods.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-87
Number of pages27
JournalMinds and machines
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 1996

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