Post-constituent Constitutionalism? The case of the European Union

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This chapter considers the general question of the relationship between constituent power and constitutional form in the context of new or shifting non-state political configurations, and specifically in the case of the constitionalization of the European Union. It examines four hypotheses on the concept of a European constituent power: non-constituent constitutionalism, constitutional scepticism, constitutional vindication, and a post-constituent constitutionalism that, unlike the others, recognizes the initial absence of a supranational constituent power but insists upon both the value and the plausibility of its subsequent development. The chapter develops a position in defence of such a post-constituent constitutionalism — one that nurtures at least some ‘constituent’ qualities without undermining the continuing constituent authority of states.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Paradox of Constitutionalism
Subtitle of host publicationConstituent Power and Constitutional Form
EditorsMartin Loughlin, Neil Walker
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages247-268
Number of pages22
ISBN (Print)0199204969, 9780199204960
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • constituent power
  • European Union
  • transnational constitutionalism
  • post-constituent constitutionalism

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Post-constituent Constitutionalism? The case of the European Union'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this