Abstract
This chapter considers the general question of the relationship between constituent power and constitutional form in the context of new or shifting non-state political configurations, and specifically in the case of the constitionalization of the European Union. It examines four hypotheses on the concept of a European constituent power: non-constituent constitutionalism, constitutional scepticism, constitutional vindication, and a post-constituent constitutionalism that, unlike the others, recognizes the initial absence of a supranational constituent power but insists upon both the value and the plausibility of its subsequent development. The chapter develops a position in defence of such a post-constituent constitutionalism — one that nurtures at least some ‘constituent’ qualities without undermining the continuing constituent authority of states.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Paradox of Constitutionalism |
Subtitle of host publication | Constituent Power and Constitutional Form |
Editors | Martin Loughlin, Neil Walker |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 247-268 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Print) | 0199204969, 9780199204960 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- constituent power
- European Union
- transnational constitutionalism
- post-constituent constitutionalism