Preference Change

Anaïs Cadilhac, Nicholas Asher, Alex Lascarides, Farah Benamara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and
actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model (Boutilier et al, 2004). Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while minimising change, like Hansson's (1995). But unlike prior models of preference change, ours supports default reasoning with partial preference information, which is essential to handle decision problems
where the decision tree isn't surveyable. We also show that our model avoids problems for other models of preference change discussed in Spohn (2009).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)267-288
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Logic, Language and Information
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2015


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