Profitable inefficiency: The politics of port infrastructure in Mombasa, Kenya

Hugh Lamarque*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article examines the distribution of power among public, private and criminal interests invested in Mombasa port. It approaches Kenya as a gatekeeper state, in which national elites compete to control the country's points of interaction with the rest of the world. Mombasa's controversial private dry ports are used to highlight (1) how the opportunity to profit from inefficiencies in container storage has been distributed among the political elite, and (2) how the development of the country's principal seaport not only reflects Kenya's underlying political settlements, but is one of the key sites in which those settlements are tested and reshaped. The case exposes a dynamic interaction between Kenya's shifting political settlement on the one hand, and the gate itself - Mombasa port's physical infrastructure and regulations - on the other.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-109
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Modern African Studies
Volume57
Issue number1
Early online date5 Mar 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Mar 2019

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