Propositions and judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A monstrous and unholy union?

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Abstract

Locke appears committed to the view that forming a propositional thought that p involves judging that p is true. He seems to inherit this commitment from traditional logics, like the Port-Royal Logic. P.T. Geach claims that pre-Fregean philosophers like Locke and Arnauld simply conflate predication and judgment and that the result is a “monstrous and unholy union.” I argue that Locke and Arnauld have good reasons for claiming that forming the propositional thought that p is to be explained in terms of judging that p, and that they can successfully respond to the problems that seem to face this view.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-280
JournalJournal of the History of Philosophy
Volume52
Issue number2
Early online date23 Apr 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014

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