Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract / Description of output

A new method is proposed for the analysis of first price and all pay auctions, where bidding functions are written not as functions of values but as functions of the rank or quantile of the bidder's value in the distribution from which it was drawn. This method gives new results in both symmetric and asymmetric cases with independent values. It is shown that under this new method if one bidder has a stochastically higher distribution of values then her bidding function in terms of rank will always be higher than her rival's. This is a clearer result under weaker conditions than using standard methods. We also look at auctions where one bidder has more precise information than the other.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages14
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2007

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • first price auctions
  • all pay auctions
  • comparative statics
  • games of incomplete information
  • stochastic dominance
  • rank
  • quantile
  • C72
  • D44
  • D82


Dive into the research topics of 'Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this