Reasoning about Rationality and Beliefs

Yakov Gal, Avi Pfeffer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

In order to succeed, agents playing games must reason about the mechanics of the game, the strategies of other agents, other agentsý reasoning about their strategies, and the rationality of agents. This paper presents a compact, natural and highly expressive language for reasoning about the beliefs and rationality of agentsý decision-making processes in games. It extends a previous version of the language in a number of important ways. Agents can reason directly about the rationality of other agents; agentsý beliefs are allowed to conflict with one another, including situations in which these beliefs form a cyclic structure; agentsý play can deviate from the normative game theoretic solution. The paper formalizes the equilibria that holds with respect to agentsý models and behavior, and provides algorithms for computing it. It also shows that the language is strictly more expressive than that of Bayesian games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Place of PublicationNew York, New York, USA
PublisherACM
Pages774-781
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)1-58113-864-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Jul 2004
EventThird International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - New York City, United States
Duration: 19 Jul 200423 Jul 2004

Conference

ConferenceThird International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Abbreviated titleAAMAS '04
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York City
Period19/07/0423/07/04

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