Reliabilism in Philosophy

Sanford C. Goldberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-117
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume142
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2009

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Reliabilism
  • Disagreement
  • Philosophical methodology

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