Abstract
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 105-117 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 142 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2009 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- Reliabilism
- Disagreement
- Philosophical methodology