Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting

Jonathan Thomas, Martin Cripps

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1401-1419
Number of pages19
JournalEconometrica
Volume63
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1995

Keywords

  • reputation
  • folk theorem
  • repeated games
  • incomplete information

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