Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Eugen Kovac; Jakub Steiner

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Eugen Kovac, Jakub Steiner

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Abstract / Description of output

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain
about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically
relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the
(ir)reversibility of early actions plays an important role in the choice among
them. We characterize the strategic effects of the reversibility option on the
coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper efficient
coordination, and we determine the direction of the effect based only on simple
features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on a generalization
of the Laplacian property known from static global games: players at the
beginning of a dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about
aggregate play of fellow players in each stage of the coordination process.

Original language	English
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages	48
Publication status	Published - 16 Jul 2008

Publication series

Name	ESE Discussion Papers
No.	183

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

delay
exit
global games
laplacian belief
learning
option
reversibility
C7
D8

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© Kovac, E., & Steiner, J. (2008). Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems. (ESE Discussion Papers; No. 183). Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
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1 Article

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems
Kovac, E. & Steiner, J., Jan 2013, In: Games and Economic Behavior. 77, 1, p. 298-320 1.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Cite this

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Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Abstract / Description of output

Publication series

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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Research output

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Cite this