Review of: Ideas, evidence, and method: Hume's skepticism and naturalism concerning knowledge and causation

Jonathan Cottrell*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalBook/Film/Article reviewpeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This is a rich, ambitious, and original study. Graciela De Pierris aims to give a new account of the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his naturalism. Notoriously, Hume gives skeptical arguments targeting our best methods of inquiry, such as inductive reasoning. So, how can he—in good intellectual conscience—endorse and rely on those very methods, in his own naturalistic investigation of the human mind (his “science of man”)? Some scholars answer that, despite his skeptical arguments, Hume does not ultimately conclude that we lack justification for beliefs formed through induction or the other methods of inquiry that he employs as a scientist of man. Others answer that his skeptical arguments do not target his own preferred conception of these methods.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)393-398
Number of pages6
JournalThe Philosophical Review
Volume126
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2017

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Review of: Ideas, evidence, and method: Hume's skepticism and naturalism concerning knowledge and causation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this