Rivalry, exclusion and coalitions

Santiago Sanchez-Pages

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model where groups can attain exclusive ownership of a resource by means of a contest. We show that more concave production technologies and more egalitarianism within groups induce higher levels of social conflict. We then study endogenous coalition formation. Under cooperative exploitation of the resource, the grand coalition is the efficient partition but there exists a strong tendency toward bipartisan conflicts. Under noncooperative exploitation, conflict can ex ante Pareto dominate peaceful access and it becomes more difficult to support the grand coalition as a stable structure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)809-830
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume9
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2007

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