Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence

Jesper Kallestrup, Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)


According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement,
where this means that the agent’s cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically depend on third-party members of their epistemic community as many social epistemologists contend, then there will be cases where two agents differ epistemically despite being virtue-theoretic duplicates. This means that robust virtue epistemology, at least insofar as it is understood along standard lines such that it endorses epistemic individualism, is also in tension with a central commitment of contemporary social epistemology.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKnowledge, Virtue, and Action
Subtitle of host publicationPutting Epistemic Virtues to Work
EditorsTim Henning, David P. Schweikard
ISBN (Print)0415807697 , 978-0415807692
Publication statusPublished - 26 Apr 2013

Publication series

NameRoutledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy


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