Robust Virtue Epistemology as Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

J. Adam Carter

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Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages15
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Early online date26 May 2014
Publication statusPublished - 2015


  • virtue epistemology
  • epistemic luck


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