@techreport{86e4c07a2b334a71a245d0382a539af5,
title = "Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Options",
abstract = "In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.",
author = "J. Sakovics and C. Ponsati",
year = "1995",
language = "English",
series = "UFAE and IAE Working Papers",
publisher = "Unitat de Fonaments de l'An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica (UAB) and Institut d'An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica (CSIC)",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Unitat de Fonaments de l'An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica (UAB) and Institut d'An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica (CSIC)",
}