Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Options

J. Sakovics; C. Ponsati

Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Options

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.

Original language	English
Publisher	Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
Publication status	Published - 1995

Publication series

Name	UFAE and IAE Working Papers

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http://ideas.repec.org/p/aub/autbar/318.95.html

1 Article

Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
Ponsati, C. & Sakovics, J., May 1998, In: Economic Theory. 11, 3, p. 667-672 6 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Cite this

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AB - In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - UFAE and IAE Working Papers

BT - Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Options

PB - Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

ER -

Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Options

Abstract

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Research output

Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

Cite this