Rule omission, rule migration and the limits of financial industry power

Adam William Chalmers*, Tehminah Naz Malik

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This paper seeks to deepen our understanding of financial industry lobbying efforts that result in specific regulatory rules being dropped from the regulatory agenda, or what we call ‘rule omission’. Critically, existing research either ignores rule omission or characterizes it as the pinnacle of lobbying success. We argue that only in carefully mapping out industry preferences and tracking what happens to rules following their omission can we say something about the extent to which finance wins or loses in its effort to shape regulation. Our analysis is based on two in-depth case studies from the European Union: (1) solvency rules in the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive (IORPP II), where rule omission does reflect a strong case of industry influence; and (2) short selling rules in the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), a case of rule omission resulting in more stringent rules over industry activities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)874-891
Number of pages18
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Research
Issue number4
Early online date12 Jan 2021
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2021

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • European Union
  • financial regulation
  • regulatory capture
  • rule migration


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