TY - UNPB
T1 - Secure Outsourcing of Circuit Manufacturing
AU - Ateniese, Giuseppe
AU - Kiayias, Aggelos
AU - Magri, Bernardo
AU - Tselekounis, Yiannis
AU - Venturi, Daniele
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - The fabrication process of integrated circuits (ICs) is complex and requires the use of off-shore foundries to lower the costs and to have access to leading-edge manufacturing facilities. Such an outsourcing trend leaves the possibility of inserting malicious circuitry (a.k.a. hardware Trojans) during the fabrication process, causing serious security issues. Hardware Trojans are very hard and expensive to detect and can disrupt the entire circuit or covertly leak sensitive information. In this paper, we propose a formal model for assessing the security of ICs whose fabrication has been outsourced to an untrusted off-shore manufacturer. We assume that the IC specification and design are trusted but the fabrication facility(ies) may be untrusted. Our objective is to stop Trojans from releasing sensitive information to the outside while still using its circuitry for day-to-day operations. We also provide two different methodologies for constructing compilers relying on verifiable computation (VC) schemes and secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols with certain properties. Suitable VC schemes, with the properties we require, were recently constructed, e.g., by Parno et al. (Oakland '13), and by Fiore, Gennaro, and Pastro (CCS '14). Similarly, many MPC protocols readily comply (or can be easily adapted to comply) with our requirements. By allowing manufacturers to use off-shore fabrication facilities, we ensure a high degree of competition among suppliers, thus providing lower cost without hindering innovation or access to leading-edge microelectronics.
AB - The fabrication process of integrated circuits (ICs) is complex and requires the use of off-shore foundries to lower the costs and to have access to leading-edge manufacturing facilities. Such an outsourcing trend leaves the possibility of inserting malicious circuitry (a.k.a. hardware Trojans) during the fabrication process, causing serious security issues. Hardware Trojans are very hard and expensive to detect and can disrupt the entire circuit or covertly leak sensitive information. In this paper, we propose a formal model for assessing the security of ICs whose fabrication has been outsourced to an untrusted off-shore manufacturer. We assume that the IC specification and design are trusted but the fabrication facility(ies) may be untrusted. Our objective is to stop Trojans from releasing sensitive information to the outside while still using its circuitry for day-to-day operations. We also provide two different methodologies for constructing compilers relying on verifiable computation (VC) schemes and secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols with certain properties. Suitable VC schemes, with the properties we require, were recently constructed, e.g., by Parno et al. (Oakland '13), and by Fiore, Gennaro, and Pastro (CCS '14). Similarly, many MPC protocols readily comply (or can be easily adapted to comply) with our requirements. By allowing manufacturers to use off-shore fabrication facilities, we ensure a high degree of competition among suppliers, thus providing lower cost without hindering innovation or access to leading-edge microelectronics.
M3 - Working paper
BT - Secure Outsourcing of Circuit Manufacturing
ER -