Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

Leonardo A. Martucci, Markulf Kohlweiss, Christer Andersson, Andriy Panchenko

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security
PublisherACM
Pages154-159
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-59593-814-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
EventFirst ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security - Alexandria, United States
Duration: 31 Mar 20082 Apr 2008
https://www.sigsac.org/wisec/WiSec2008/

Conference

ConferenceFirst ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security
Abbreviated titleWiSec08
CountryUnited States
CityAlexandria
Period31/03/082/04/08
Internet address

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