Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

Leonardo A. Martucci; Markulf Kohlweiss; Christer Andersson; Andriy Panchenko

doi:10.1145/1352533.1352558

Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

Leonardo A. Martucci, Markulf Kohlweiss, Christer Andersson, Andriy Panchenko

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security
Publisher	ACM
Pages	154-159
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-59593-814-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1352533.1352558
Publication status	Published - 2008
Event	First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security - Alexandria, United States Duration: 31 Mar 2008 → 2 Apr 2008 https://www.sigsac.org/wisec/WiSec2008/

Conference

Conference	First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security
Abbreviated title	WiSec08
Country/Territory	United States
City	Alexandria
Period	31/03/08 → 2/04/08
Internet address	https://www.sigsac.org/wisec/WiSec2008/

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10.1145/1352533.1352558

https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1352533.1352558

Cite this

@inproceedings{c10563d9d6e64cceaa1aa8c5c7ab708e,

title = "Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms",

abstract = "Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.",

author = "Martucci, {Leonardo A.} and Markulf Kohlweiss and Christer Andersson and Andriy Panchenko",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1145/1352533.1352558",

language = "English",

pages = "154--159",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security",

publisher = "ACM",

note = "First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security, WiSec08 ; Conference date: 31-03-2008 Through 02-04-2008",

url = "https://www.sigsac.org/wisec/WiSec2008/",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

AU - Martucci, Leonardo A.

AU - Kohlweiss, Markulf

AU - Andersson, Christer

AU - Panchenko, Andriy

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.

AB - Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.

U2 - 10.1145/1352533.1352558

DO - 10.1145/1352533.1352558

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 154

EP - 159

BT - Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security

PB - ACM

T2 - First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security

Y2 - 31 March 2008 through 2 April 2008

ER -

Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

Abstract

Conference

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