Self-enforcing wage contracts redux

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This paper provides a personal perspective on self-enforcing wage contracts. We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)441-469
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - 30 Nov 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • rational contracts
  • risk sharing
  • limited commitment


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