Abstract
This article analyses antiluck epistemology, and sensitivity-based and safety-based theories of knowledge in relation to skepticism. It suggests that the main motivation for sensitivity-based theories of knowledge is that they seem to offer a very neat resolution of at least one form of the skeptical problem. The problem with the use of sensitivity-based theories in responding to radical skepticism is that the closure principle is highly intuitive, intuitive that many feel that rejecting closure is too costly a price to pay for a resolution of the skeptical challenge.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780199892020 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780195183214 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2 Sept 2009 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- Antiluck epistemology
- Closure principle
- Skepticism
- Theories of knowledge